Using the data of the abstracts of asset valuation reports disclosed during 2001 and 2002 by the listed companies of Shanghai Stock Exchange,this paper investigates the relationship between the tunneling motivation of large shareholder and the bias of asset valuation.Our result shows that,when the listed companies receive the asset to be valuated,the value increase rate of asset valuation is significantly higher in the transaction with large shareholder than it in the transaction with other parties,implying that the tunneling behavior of large shareholder through manipulating the asset valuation is prevalent.
本文基于核准制下"大发审委"(第十七届发行审核委员会)从严审核的自然实验,考察了IPO(initial public offering,首次公开募股)从严审核的资源配置效应。研究发现,在严格的问责制度下,中国证券监督管理委员会发行审核委员会(简称发审委)倾向于显著地降低发审通过率,同时规避自身风险,选择财务指标良好的低风险企业(营业收入增长高的企业),而回避高风险但可能具有发展潜力的企业(研发费用高的企业)。其次,在从严审核时期,拟上市企业承担了更多的IPO费用以提高IPO审核通过率。此外,相较非"大发审委"时期的过会企业,"大发审委"审核通过的企业更可能出现业绩变脸,这样的审核标准忽略了企业未来的成长性和发展潜力,没有得到投资者的认同,市场表现也更差。
