The identity theory of mind,though it is appealing for its naturalistic stance and conciseness,has long been faced with two major objections,which are "the multiple realizability" and "the hard problem of consciousness".However,David Papineau has developed a suggestion to fix up the identity theory once and for all recently.I call this move "the phenomenal concepts proposal",which is constituted by "the phenomenal concepts strategy" and "the indeterminacy thesis of phenomenal concepts".Some philosophers have challenged this new version of identity theory from one or another aspect,whereas José Luis Bermúdez points out that if both the two components of Papineau’s proposal can be established,the identity theory would be structurally inconsistent.In this paper,after a survey to the debate between Papineau and Bermúdez,I like to formulate and evaluate several possible alternatives to break through Bermúdez’s critique.My conclusion is that,even though Bermúdez’s argument is perfectly sound and powerful,Papineau can modify his view on the "quotational model of phenomenal concepts" without doing any harm to his "phenomenal concepts proposal".
