Temporal key integrity protocol(TKIP) is a sub-protocol of IEEE 802.11i.TKIP remedies some security flaws in wired equivalent privacy(WEP) protocol.TKIP adds four new algorithms to WEP:a message integrity code(MIC) called Michael,an initialization vector(IV) sequencing discipline,a key mixing function and a re-keying mechanism.The key mixing function,also called temporal key hash,de-correlates the IVs from weak keys.Some cryptographic properties of the substitution box(S-box) used in the key mixing function are investigated in this paper,such as regularity,avalanche effect,differ uniform and linear structure.Moen et al pointed out that there existed a temporal key recovery attack in TKIP key mixing function.In this paper a method is proposed to defend against the attack,and the resulting effect on performance is discussed.
In Crypto＇05, Boneh et al. presented two broadcast encryption schemes. Their work has exciting achievements： the header （also called ciphertexts） and the private keys are of constant size. In their paper, they give an open question to construct a traitor tracing algorithm for their broadcast encryption schemes, and combine the two systems to obtain an efficient trace-and-revoke system. In this paper, we give a negative answer to their open question. More precisely, we show that three or more insider users are able to collude to forge a valid private key for pirate decoding against their schemes. Moreover, we prove that there exists no traitor tracing algorithm to identify the colluders. Our pirate decoding can also similarly be applied to Lee et al.＇s broadcast encryption schemes in ISPEC＇06.
B.Libert and J.Quisquater proposed an identity(ID)-based threshold decryption scheme. This paper found flaw in their security reduction and presented two methods to prove this scheme is resist against chosen-plaintext attack(CPA), based on the weaker model of security known as selective ID-based threshold CPA and the common model known as ID-based threshold CPA respectively.
Pervasive computing environment is a distributed and mobile space. Trust relationship must be established and ensured between devices and the systems in the pervasive computing environment. The trusted computing （TC） technology introduced by trusted computing group is a distributed-system-wide approach to the provisions of integrity protection of resources. The TC＇s notion of trust and security can be described as conformed system behaviors of a platform environment such that the conformation can be attested to a remote challenger. In this paper the trust requirements in a pervasive/ubiquitous environment are analyzed. Then security schemes for the pervasive computing are proposed using primitives offered by TC technology.
To deal with the key-exposure problem in signature systems, a new framework named parallel key-insulated signature (PKIS) was introduced, and a concrete PKIS scheme was proposed. Compared with traditional key-insulated signature (KIS) schemes, the proposed PKIS scheme allows a frequent updating for temporary secret keys without increasing the risk of helper key-exposure. Moreover, the proposed PKIS scheme does not collapse even if some (not all) of the helper keys and some of the temporary secret keys are simultaneously exposed. As a result, the security of the PKIS scheme is greatly enhanced, and the damage caused by key-exposure is successfully minimized.
Quantum key agreement is one of the approaches to unconditional security. Since 1980’s, different protocols for quantum key agreement have been proposed and analyzed. A new quantum key agreement protocol was presented in 2004, and a detailed analysis to the protocol was given. The possible game played between legitimate users and the enemy was described: sitting in the middle, an adversary can play a “man-in-the-middle” attack to cheat the sender and receiver. The information leaked to the adversary is essential to the length of the final quantum secret key. It was shown how to determine the amount of information leaked to the enemy and the amount of uncertainty between the legitimate sender and receiver.
Verifiably encrypted signatures are employed when a signer wants to sign a message for a verifier but does not want the verifier to possess his signature on the message until some certain requirements of his are satisfied. This paper presented new verifiably encrypted signatures from bilinear pairings. The proposed signatures share the properties of simplicity and efficiency with existing verifiably encrypted signature schemes. To support the proposed scheme, it also exhibited security proofs that do not use random oracle assumption. For existential unforgeability, there exist tight security reductions from the proposed verifiably encrypted signature scheme to a strong but reasonable computational assumption.
