Let D be a generalized dihedral group and Autcol（D） its Coleman automorphism group. Denote by Outcol（D） the quotient group of Autcol（D） by Inn（D）, where Inn（D） is the inner automorphism group of D. It is proved that either Outcol（D） = i or Outcol（D） is an elementary abelian 2-group whose order is completely determined by the cardinality of π（D）. Furthermore, a necessary and sufficient condition for Outcol（D） = 1 is obtained. In addition, whenever Outcol（D） ≠ 1, it is proved that Autcol（D） is a split extension of Inn（D） by an elementary abelian 2-group for which an explicit description is given.
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
WANG LeiGAO HongWeiPETROSYAN LeonQIAO HanSEDAKOV Artem
