This paper explores the existence of multiple equilibria for symmetric 3 indi- vidual, 2 good CES / LES pure exchange economies. Analytically, we show that there are no more than 5 equilibria in such economies. The number of equilibria varies from 5 to 3 then to 1. We generalize our analytical results of existence of 1, 3, 5 equilibria for a wide range of parametrizations. We also provide concrete examples of 1, 3, 5 equilibria with parameter zones specified.
This paper employs the real option theory to develop a pricing model for the transfer of property rights.We list the conditions for the good,intermediate and bad firms respectively,and work out the closed-form solution to the equilibrium transfer price,the optimal transfer timing.Using the comparative static analysis,we find that for good firms the transfer price of the target is increasing in its capital.The higher the capital of the target owns,the faster it will be transferred.For intermediate and bad firms,similar conclusions can be derived.The larger gap between the acquirer＇s size and market power and those of the target,the lower the transfer triggered price.The transfer price goes up as the capital ratio of the acquirer over the target diminishes,while it is decreasing in the amount of the capital the target owns.
This paper explores the existence of 3 equilibria for symmetric 2-individual 2-good CES/LES pure exchange economies. For certain parameterizations in the economies, we show analytically that there are no more than 3 equilibria. We generalize our analytical results of existence of 3 equilibria for a wide range of parameterizations. Then we provide examples of 3 equilibria and parameter zones of 3 equilibria for CES and CES/LES economies.
